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This paper deals with developments of technology through historical perspective. This stand 
point allows us to monitor long term processes of technology development and its influence 
on economic development of countries in terms of technology leadership, technology gap and 
catch-up process. The historical perspective taken in this paper starts with the First Industrial 
Revolution as a braking point and ends with the present days. This focus is taken due to 











The technology, technology change and technological progress have played and important 
role in the development of human kind. In this research we will not discuss the overall history 
of technological progress, but rather, we will take a stand from an important historical event 
that happened in the 18th century in Britain. 
This event was the First Industrial Revolution, so we build our story from this point in 
time onward. By doing this we will evaluate the historical perspective on two accounts. One 
account will take into consideration the developments i  terms of industrial revolutions. The 
second account involves the historical perspective of catch-up process among countries 
related to technological changes in production processes, in innovation and invention 
processes, and developments that influenced further increases of expenditures for science and 
technology. 
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The first instance in history where a society broke through from an agrarian society to 
industrial domination is associated with the First Industrial Revolution. Landes (2003) 
distinguished two separate meanings and use of the word “industrial revolution”. The first one 
is the “industrial revolution” in small letters, whic  refers to the “complex of technological 
innovations which, by substituting machines for human skill and inanimate power for human 
and animal force, brings about a shift from handicraft to manufacture and, in so doing, gives 
birth to a modern economy” (Landes, 2003: 1). The second instance is when the words are in 
capital letters, where they encompass a different meaning denoting “the first historical 
instance of the breakthrough from an agrarian, handicraft economy to one dominated by 
industry and machine manufacture” (Landes, 2003: 1). 
How big the difference between the life before and fter the First Industrial Revolution 
was, sometimes compared to the change after discovery f fire, is coined in Landes’ words 
(2003: 5): “…the Englishmen of 1750 were closer in material things to Caesar’s legionnaires 
than to his own great-grand-children.” 
This is not to say that there were no important technological advances in history before 
the First Industrial Revolution. On the contrary, China in the 14th century was probably far 
more advanced than Europe. However, all the advances before the First Industrial Revolution 
did not yield the process in which countries became industrialized. 
The First Industrial Revolution is a product of the eighteenth century. It encompasses a 
variety of innovations, especially in the cotton industry of England. It was the time of 
transformation from handicrafts to a factory system of production. The very important effect 
of the Industrial Revolution was that it was self-sustainable, unlike the situation before the 
Revolution, where any improvement in conditions and opportunities were dampened by the 
increase in population, thus keeping income in the low level equilibrium trap (Malthusian 
trap). This situation can be, in some sense, related to the developing countries with high 
population growth today.  
There are two important senses that deserve the label “revolution”. First, technological 
advance made it possible to escape from the Malthusian trap where the rising population 
matched or even outstripped the growth in output, thus preventing any rise in GDP per capita. 
At this point Britain was able to accommodate a population growth of up to 1.5 percent 
annually, unlike before 1700, where population growth above 0.5 caused real wages to fall. At 
the same time Britain became the richest European eco omy. Second, Britain went through a 
period of rapid structural change in employment. The c ange was towards a more urbanised 
and industrialised labour force than in any other relatively advanced country (Crafts, 1998). 
However, the First Industrial Revolution, and subsequent industrial revolutions, was 
nothing but swift, as the word “revolution” suggests. Each technological advance has the life 
of its own, and its life cycle. In the end, when an in ovation has fulfilled its lifecycle, it is 
simply substituted with another, newer technology. This is not a smooth process. It takes time 
before a certain innovation is diffused.  
Even the most important inventions had a very modest impact initially. The full 
potential developed and materialised only after the potential of a technology was explored. 
This was often done through using the technologies th mselves and as they became cheaper 
and widely diffused. One example is the “social savings”. This stipulates a reduction in real 
resource costs, and an estimate for the steam engine suggests it to be at no more than 0.2 
percent of GDP in 1800. However, usage of the steam ngine in terms of horsepower was 
35,000 in the year 1800 and about two million in 1870. By 1870, the implications of the steam 
 
engine were fully realised and social savings went up o about 3.5 percent of GDP, excluding 
the larger impact of the railways (Crafts, 1998). 
Young (1993) suggests that most new technologies ar initially broadly inferior to the 
older technologies they seek to replace and are only competitive in a narrow range of 
specialised functions. Subsequent improvements that take place over time allow new 
technologies to ultimately dominate. For example, th  steam engine of James Watt in 1765 
was at the time a crudely engineered piston, which was used mainly in the mines for pumping 
water. In terms of provision of power, it was not a substitute for the widely used water wheel. 
It was after the innovations by John Wilkinson1 i  1776 and William Murdock2 in 1781 that 
the steam engine was useful for converting vertical motion into rotary force. Only after these 
inventions the steam engine became a generally useful source of power. 
The great advance of the First Industrial Revolution was not a shift from labour to 
capital, or new materials and machines, but rather a factory system. This system provided the 
possibility to engage large number of workers as well as capital to work under supervision 
and discipline. This all required new organisational techniques and capabilities because the 
scale of operations increased. As Landes (2003: 122) put it, “the factory was a new bridge 
between invention and innovation”, and goes even further to conclude that previous 
transformations, political or economic, had always finished by stabilising at a new position of 
equilibrium, while the case of the Industrial Revolution suggests an ongoing change and 
moving equilibrium. 
The common view of the industrial revolution is that of a transition in which directions 
and possibilities of economic life were transformed nabling dramatic demographic 
challenges to be defeated in the long run. The changes involved here were complex and costs 
were considerable, both in the long and short run. However, the progress depended on new 
standards of economic efficiency, i.e. productivity growth. The growth in productivity can 
come from changing methods or increasing resources, or, for some time, both. Whatever the 
case, attitudes, perceptions and understanding of production methods and opportunities were 
central to the process (Hoppit, 1990). 
The one distinguishing, important factor for Britain at the time of the First Industrial 
Revolution was the partnership of inventors and entrepreneurs (e.g. Boulton-Watt 
partnership), which was one of the most important organisational techniques for establishment 
and take-off of new innovative firms (Freeman, Soete, 1997). 
The analysis made by Freeman and Soete (1997) clearly shows that most conditions 
affecting the industrial innovation in the Industrial Revolution is still relevant for success 
today.  
Although England was on the forefront of Industrial Revolution, other industrial nations 
in Europe did not lag behind. In 1785 Britain was still leading, however, the lead over France 
in the volume of output per capita from mines and manufactures was not as significant as fifty 
years before. The situation with the use of machinery and large furnaces and prevalence of 
large privately owned enterprises is much the same s for mines and manufactures in 1785 
(Nef, 1943). It is obvious that the lead of Britain was not always progressing at the same pace. 
Continental Europe followed the pace and narrowed the gap between the leader and the 
followers. It seems that the rate of economic change in France during the most of the 
eighteenth century was not less remarkable than that of Britain. 
The estimates today suggest that Britain’s trend rate of growth of real GDP growth 
accelerated steadily rather than spectacularly in the period after 1780. The peak was in the 
mid-nineteenth century at about 2.5 percent. Even though the output growth was spectacular 
                                                
1John Wilkinson eliminated gaps between piston and cylinders, which have previously been stuffed with rags. 
2William Murdock provided the sun and planet gearing system that actually made it possible to have rotary 
force. 
 
in industries such as cotton textiles, where production techniques advanced, this was a smaller 
portion of the aggregate economy. This aggregate included quite a number of traditional 
activities, which grew quite slowly (Crafts, 1998). 
However, national accounting approach cannot encompass all the elements of change of 
the industrial revolution. National accounts may stimulate ideas and provide very rough 
orders of magnitude about certain aspects of the industrial revolution. Some parts of this 
process can be counted, but some cannot (Hoppit, 1990). 
Britain started forging ahead of France in the late 1780s. The production of iron in 
Britain in 1780 was around a third more than in France. In 1840 Britain was producing over 
three times as much. The lead of Britain came in the time of Napoleonic Wars. A similar thing 
happened in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century when Britain became the leading 
European country in the development of heavy industry. In this period it was the Religious 
Wars and the Thirty Years’ War that helped Britain gain its supremacy (Nef, 1943). It should 
be noted further that advances in productivity were modest before the railway age. The 
general improvements in living standards were not experienced until 1820s. However, two 
effects were experienced in Britain early in comparison with other industrialised nations. 
These were the shift from agriculture to industry and dependence of manufacturing industry 
on exports (Hoppit, 1990). It is obvious how important it is to avoid destruction and draining 
of resources in wars for the development of a country. The relative isolation of the Island was 
an asset in terms of development and conditions for up emacy. 
Even though the concentration of technology and technology change is mostly attributed 
to the manufacturing industry, the technological change in agriculture was not unimportant. 
The agricultural productivity in Britain in the eighteenth century rose but not as much as in 
industry. Historians even point out that mobility of labour and capital, essential to industrial 
growth, were made possible due to social and economic improvements in agriculture. In the 
countries industrialising today, especially in Asia, even though the industrial sector has 
increased production more rapidly than agriculture, output in agriculture has a steady rise and 
incomes in the rural areas have improved as well. Successful land reforms in Korea and 
Taiwan, unlike in Latin American countries, was a very significant factor in the subsequent 
growth and development performance (Freeman, Soete, 1997). However, agriculture as an 






























Changes in occupation in the past and future 
 
 
Source: Freeman, Soete, 1997: 4 
 
 
The change in the structure of labour in agriculture and industry with the shift of labour 
from agriculture towards industry is argued to be attributed to the increase in per capita 
income from 1869 to 1899 in the US. It is further argued that the growth of income per capita 
actually reduced income share of agriculture because of low elasticity of demand for 
agricultural products. Subsequently this led to a reduction in the agricultural labour force. 
However, the predicted reduction of the share of income of agriculture was less than the 
actual reduction. On the other hand, the years withthe fastest growth of income were the 
period in which the farm income share declined the least (Lewis, 1979). 
 
 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, cotton manufacturers were combining 
sets of new and traditional technologies. This combination typically included steam powered 
spinning in factories with large-scale employment of d mestic handloom weavers and a mix 
of powered and domestic hand weaving, long after th powered technology became available. 
The combination of technology was due to risk spreading, problems involved with new 
technologies, and the cheap labour supply of women and children. For some time, the 
traditional sector, and not the other way around bolstered the modern sector. The structural 
changes experienced in this period were largely due to the ability of agriculture to rapidly 
decrease its share of the labour force; thus more labour was available for industry. 
Furthermore, the exploitation of international comparative advantage in a narrow range of 
goods was another significant point (Hoppit, 1990). 
Even though industrial transformation was not as intense in other industries as in cotton, 
it can be said that it did give rise to differing exp riences and social relations. Many 
innovations and inventions in organisation and use of labour were common to all industries 
and sectors. It may be further said that the industrial revolution was not merely a sum of 
social and economic changes added up, but rather more a sum of measurable parts (Berg, 
Hudson, 1992). 
The historical events of cluster of technological advances during the industrial 
revolution, especially in textiles, cannot be explained in an endogenous innovation 
framework. Mokyr (1990) argues that innovations associated with the industrial revolution 
should be seen as “macroinventions”. It is suggested that these are unpredictable, exogenous 
shocks that lead to advances in respective sectors. The wave of these “macroinventions” in 
turn gives rise to learning possibilities; however these learning possibilities are exhausted 
over time (Crafts, 1998). 
It must be said however, that “macroinventions” arevery unpredictable. They are 
commonly generated as a result of individual genius or luck. On the other hand, 
“microinventions” are generated through subsequent improvement, adaptation, and diffusion 
of technology, commonly involving learning by doing and learning by using. Much of the 
productivity increases can be attributed to the latr. However, “microinventions” in any given 
technology are subject to diminishing returns, and without periodical bursts of 
“macroinventions”, productivity growth would lead to zero (Crafts, 1995). 
It seems that technological change cannot be entirely explained either through endogenous 
innovation or through exogenous innovation. There is st ll the possibility that exogenous 
(macroinventions) trigger off subsequent endogenous (microinventions). The example can be 
drawn from the textiles industry where the experts in this field strongly deny that the 
breakthroughs of the 1760s can be explained by demand pressure or by supply-side models 
(Crafts, Mills, 1997). In Britain’s situation, where technology was hard to transfer, and 
learning by doing and natural resources were in the spot light, seems to be the reason why the 
traditional neo-classical predictions do not hold (Crafts, 1998). 
There are several possible factors that may have influenced low TFP growth (and R&D) 
in the early nineteenth century Britain. Smallness of markets, weakness of science and formal 
education, inadequacies of the patent system, the continued high rewards to rent seeking, and 
the difficulties of securing compliant behaviour on the part of workers may have contributed 
to the slowdown to a certain level. As far as the government is concerned, its policy did not 
play an active role in correcting failures nor in ay other way did it intervene to correct 
market failures, compared to the successful governmnt role in the Asian success stories like 
Korea, and Taiwan. The policy had quite the opposite role. This was viewed in the crowding 
out effect of public spending during the Napoleonic Wars. These financial pressures pushed 
for more protectionism during the eighteenth century and to rise in taxes during the industrial 
revolution (Crafts, 1996). 
 
The ongoing transformation of economies after the first industrial revolution is labelled 
the second industrial revolution. As the first industrial revolution, the second one is 
continuation of development started by the first revolution. As mentioned earlier, these 
processes are more evolutionary than revolutionary. The innovation and inventions have 
emerged, but the diffusion of the same is a much slower process. 
The beginning of the second industrial revolution is labelled with several distinctions in 
comparison to the time before the revolution. These differences are given through three 
different ideas. First, the accounting got an improved role. From mere record of past events it 
developed into an applied science to help business d cision-making. Secondly, engineers 
applied the results of pure science in order to get higher safety and economy in the 
construction of bridges and other works, and ships and boilers. The old methods, which 
included the rule of thumb and trial and error, were substituted with precise calculations and 
measurements. These new methods were of great importance in electrical engineering and 
slowly spread through mechanical engineering. Thirdly, there was constantly increasing 
competition among manufacturers and widening markets. The application of scientific ideas 
for the workshop along with the cost accounting represented a birth of scientific management. 
Taylor, by publishing his article Principles of Scientific Management, marked an acceleration 
of the second industrial revolution. There was a great movement of reorganisation in industry 
based on improved efficiency named “rationalisation”. The rationalisation was based on 
preplanning of equipment and labour methods on the basis of observation and estimates found 
in science (Jevons, 1931). 
There was an important shift here regarding the scintif c methods. During the first 
industrial revolution much of the innovations and iventions were based on trial and error 
methodology, and on the rule of thumb. As economies and operations developed, this 
methodology was not sufficient any longer. Development of science introduced laboratories 
both in public and private domain. These laboratories were either merely for testing materials, 
or for research. Jevons (1931) distinguishes three classes of problems of laboratories. First, 
there was a pure science, which was usually carried out at universities and science institutes. 
Secondly, there was fundamental research for an industry, e.g. for cotton or steel industries. 
Thirdly, there was the pure trade research, carried out by companies themselves in their own 
laboratories, the subject of examination being their own plant, materials and processes, in the 
light of the results of scientific and fundamental research. The problem with the latter emerges 
when laboratories are understaffed, unable to synthesise fundamental and science research 
results for their own purpose. A very important distinguishing characteristic of the second 
industrial revolution is the professionalizing industry. Functions, e.g. administrative, technical 
and managerial, are clearly distinguished along with the recognition of the qualification 
requirements for certain positions. Furthermore, th type of an institution characteristic for the 
second industrial revolution is the research institute. The organisational form of such a 
research institute may be as a government or university department, an association, or an 
independent corporation. 
The exploitation of technologies associated with the Second Industrial Revolution 
continues today. Major innovations and inventions (e.g. internal combustion engine, 
electricity, etc.) are still in use today with some improved features. However, the main 
principles and ideas are the same. 
The "New Economy" associated with advances in information and communication 
technology (ICT) is sometimes associated with transference of economies from industrial to 
information societies. However, the advances made by using ICT are far from the benefits 
associated with the two industrial revolutions. Up until the end of the 1980s economists could 
see all the computers but actual benefits were hardto distinguish. The potential of ICT was 
made clear in the 1990s. The only question is whether t is constitutes an industrial 
 
revolution? Still, there is no compelling evidence that ICT could constitute the next industrial 




Backwardness and Catch-up Process 
 
Britain was a pioneer in the process of industrialisation, so it did not have an opportunity 
to catch-up to anyone. The feature of catching-up was a pronounced feature of rapid growth in 
Europe after World War II. Nineteenth century Britain could not have stimulated growth 
through technology transfer from advanced countries for a very simple reason. Britain was on 
the top of technology development so all the best practices and technological advancement 
were already at the disposal. Furthermore, it could not evolve by evolving away from small-
scale peasant agriculture, since it had already done that (Crafts, 1998).  
However, even though Britain practised increased protectionism in products markets 
during the industrial revolution, it was certainly open and receptive to foreign ideas (Crafts, 
1996). It seems that in spite of an unfavourable government policy Britain managed to emerge 
as a technological leader. Openness to foreign ideas may well have played an important role 
in the process. Endogenous innovations are naturally favourable, along with the threshold of 
knowledge; however, new ideas do not always emerge in one country. This is a distinct 
advantage that Britain capitalised on, unlike some other countries (e.g. France) where 
acknowledgement of foreign practices took longer to take root. 
When looking at the leadership position, it is a fact that the countries with the fastest 
growth in the past one hundred years are not those who grew fastest in the preceding century. 
The leading countries of the Middle Ages, Brabant, Lombardy, Venice, or Dubrovnik, never 
regained their former position in the world as fast growing economies. The same can also be 
said for Egypt, which has never regained the rule ov r the grain trade (Ames, Rosenberg, 
1963). 
Abramovitz (1986) has developed the catch-up hypothesis with the US as leader and 
Western European countries as followers. His proposition is that in comparisons across 
countries the growth rates of productivity in any long period tend to be inversely related to the 
initial levels of productivity. It is further suggested that the width of the gap plays a role in the 
whole process. The larger the technological and the productivity gap between leader and 
follower, the stronger the potential for growth of f llower countries. So it follows that the 
catch-up is faster for countries that are initially more backward. However, the potential for 
growth wears down as the follower converges closer to the leader. 
But, why has the success endowed Korea and Taiwan, but not the Philippines? Lucas 
(1993) suggests some answers to this question. The East Asian miracle countries have become 
large-scale exporters of manufactured goods with increasing sophistication and have become 
highly urbanised (not a problem for Hong Kong and Singapore) and well educated. 
Furthermore, high level of savings, pro-business governments, with different mixes of laissez-
faire and mercantilist commercial policies certainly adde  to the effort. These are just 
components, which may consist of all or some parts, but are not the whole picture. If a 
country is advised to adopt the “Korean model” it is like advising to “follow the Michael 
Jordan model” in basketball. In order for these policies to be useful they should be broken 
down to parts in order to see how different components attributed to the whole performance. 
It should be considered which aspect is imitable and which are worth imitating.  
The advances of today’s developed countries after Wo ld War II in Europe have shown 
unprecedented growth performance. It is argued that this performance was due to the backlog 
of unexploited technology. This is particularly view d in the light of methods already in use 
 
in the US, but not employed in Europe. Here, the US can be seen as the leader and other 
countries as followers. However, the initial backlog and its reduction with time cannot be the 
sole explanation for either speeding-up or slowdown, but it constitutes an important part. 
It should be noted that the Russian iron industry in 1750 was the largest in the world. 
However, it was based on a charcoal technology, and as a consequence, the British who 
switched from charcoal to coke as fuel displaced this technology in 1790s. 
In another example, some simple technical problems have not been solved for centuries, 
which were repetitively used. One of those is that Europeans strangled their horses with the 
throat and girth harness for a very long time. Only after the Avar invasion the more superior 
trace harness was used from the sixth century AD. On the other side of the world, China 
exhibited extraordinary technical progress up until the end of the Sung dynasty in the mid 
thirteenth century. After that China experienced almost total technological stagnation until 
nineteenth century. At that time they began to imitate European technology which was 
superior (Young, 1993). This supports leader-follower shift hypothesis, at least to a certain 
extent. China today and in the last twenty years experienced an extraordinary growth. This 
growth is not sporadic, but seems persistent and sustainable. However, in recent years, 
Chinese growth has influenced world markets by the increase in demand, thus increasing 
prices in the world, especially for raw materials. It seems that Chinese growth is progressing 
too fast and may be considered unbalanced in the international sense. It should be noted, 
though, that China is not a technological leader as it was by the mid-thirteenth century, but 
rather a rapid follower with vast catch-up potential. 
Abramovitz (1986) attributes technological backwardness to the social conditions of a 
country, where tenacious societal characteristics are associated with a portion of a country’s 
failure to achieve the level of productivity of more advanced economies. He coined the term 
“social capability”. When social capability is incorp rated, it follows that a country’s 
potential for rapid growth is strong not when it is backward without qualifications, but rather 
when it is technologically backward but socially adv nced. 
Furthermore, the industry on the European continent (“late-comers”) adopted investment 
banking while England (early starter) never adopted it. It can be concluded that early starters 
develop a certain level of rigidity which influences not only firms but freedom of entry as 
well (Ames, Rosenberg, 1963). 
When a country moves from lower to higher technology level, the cost of moving from 
one level to another is an increasing function of the level of technology already in use. On the 
other hand, as a country develops, the speed of development slows down as the country 
reaches higher levels of development. This is so because changes required for advancement 
are more infrequent (Ames, Rosenberg, 1963). 
In the case that advanced technology is largely scale-dependent, and there are further 
obstacles to trade, political obstacles etc., which prove to be important, large countries will 
have a stronger potential for growth than smaller countries (Abramovitz, 1986). 
By the beginning of the twentieth century the US took ver as the industrial leader over 
Britain. The technological lead of the US was very real and the gap became even more 
substantial during and after World War II. As Nelson and Wright (1992) argue, on the 
microeconomic level, the US firms were significantly ahead in application and development 
of the leading edge technologies. US made up the largest portion of the world trade, and 
overseas branches were often dominant in their host countries. Today, that is no longer the 
case. US technological lead has been eroded in many industries, and in some, the US is even 
lagging behind. There are two distinctive slices of the US dominance in the post war world. 
One is the dominance in the mass production, derived from favourable historical access to 
natural resources and single largest domestic market. Th  other part of the story is the lead in 
the high technology industries induced by massive private and public investment in R&D and 
 
scientific and technical education that the US made ft r World War II. Even though these 
investments stem from earlier institutional foundations, the leadership in this area is much the 
product of the post war era. However, it is sometims argued that the strength that American 
companies possess is less based on technology per se as in the organisational efficiencies 
stemming from mass production and mass distribution. One of the most spectacular success 
stories in the US in the inter-war years was automobile industry. It was a blend of mass 
production methods, cheap materials and fuels. The technological leadership itself was more 
lasting in the industries where there was connection of mass production and organised 
science-based research, e.g. electrical industries and chemical engineering. 
There are two views on the reasons of the US technological performance. One sees the 
US post- war lead as inherently transient. This is partially attributed to the late start of many 
present rivals, which is in accordance with the “leapfrogging” hypothesis, and in the other 
part it is attributed to the destruction of industrial ivals during the war. The convergence is 
seen here as relatively automatic and inevitable. Th  other view is that the US is loosing in the 
competitiveness to other industrialised nations. The t ird proposal stresses a more 
fundamental decline in the role of national borders and nationally based industrial centres 
(Nelson, Wright, 1992). 
As Edgerton and Horrocks (1994) argue, in Britain before 1914, the research staff 
actually technically qualified in industry was just a fraction of the total staff. By that time, the 
dominant function of scientists was not research but rather analytical control of production 
with a fraction of time devoted to research. However, many firms in Britain have spent a lot 
of money on research conducted outside their firms, before they recognised the necessity of in 
house research departments. Furthermore, many firmsemployed outside consultants to carry 
out testing and R&D of new products before establishing their own research departments.  
However, during World War I the amount of research increased dramatically in British 
industry. The increase was due to the demand for prducts new to Britain or entirely new 
products. Many companies started to up-size their research potential, existing organisations 
expanded their operations and new laboratory units were built. Such an increase in the R&D 
activity during the First World War has proven to be very beneficial to the firms, which 
consequently strengthened R&D position within firms and further increased the funds for this 
purpose. In the period after the war the expansion continued in the cash rich firms. Some of 
these firms were in need of replacement of founding inventor-entrepreneurs. The chemical 
industry poses a good example. This industry was extremely R&D intensive, but this was no 
longer inventor-entrepreneur activity due to its size and complexity of research, which needed 
research laboratories and trained scientists. The British Dyestuffs Corporation, a merger 
between Levinstein and British Dyes, spent some £250,000 in 1919-20 for new laboratories, 
which employed some 80 people as research chemists. However, some downsizing of 
operations occurred and research staff was cut to 30 in 1923 and after that to only 15. 
Nevertheless, in the period 1921-4 the company seem to have spent some £50,000 annually 
for research. However, the R&D spending in the US, in absolute terms, was some ten times 
greater than that of British industry in the late 1930s (Edgerton, Horrocks, 1994). 
Furthermore, Abramovitz (1993) distinguishes different ways in which technology has 
influenced economy in nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The first, but not the crucial, 
difference is the pace of technological progress; however, the character of technological 
progress seems to be more crucial in this division of centuries. This may be the reason why 
the conventional capital accumulation has played such an important role in growth accounting 
for the nineteenth century and a much smaller role in the twentieth century. In the nineteenth 
century technological progress was heavily biased in a physical capital using direction, only 
to shift toward intangible (human knowledge) capital using direction in the twentieth century. 
This bias produced a substantial contribution of education and of other intangible capital 
 
accumulation. The technological change of the twentieth century tended to positively 
influence the relative marginal productivity of capit l in terms of education and training of the 
labour force at all levels, from deliberately acquired knowledge through R&D investment, and 
in other forms of intangible capital (e.g. support f r corporate and managerial structures and 
cultures, development of product markets subject to the infrastructure of the economies of 
scale and scope). The bias shift of the twentieth century encompasses the change in 
employment patterns. The shift occurred from agriculture (low education levels) to 
manufacturing, mining and construction (intermediate education levels) to services (relatively 
high education levels). There are several factors that contributed to this shift. First, there was 
an increase in income level per capita and associated Engle effect on the structure of the final 
demand. Second, growths of the service industries, due to requirements of exploitation of 
scale intensive technological progress (e.g. trade, communications, and finance, legal, 
accounting and engineering professions). Finally, there was a technology bias toward 
agriculture and industry, where the productivity of labour was raised more than in services. 
Parente and Prescott (1994) take on the argument about the barriers to technology 
adoption and development. They argue that for a particular firm to go from one technology 
level to another depends on several key factors. Fit is the level of general and scientific 
knowledge in the world and size of the barriers to ad ption in the firm’s country. Second, 
general scientific, or world, knowledge is available to all and grows exogenously. With the 
growth of world knowledge the investment that must be undertaken to move from one 
technological level to another decreases. The implication of the later is that with fixed income 
levels and technology adoption barriers, development rates increase over time. This fact has 
been supported empirically over the last 170 years, where development rates have actually 
increased. 
The positive definition of social infrastructure includes institutions and government 
policies that support incentives for individuals and firms in an economy. These incentives 
encompass measures as encouragement of productive ai ities such as the accumulation of 
skills or the development of new goods and production echniques. Additionally, a good 
social infrastructure may invoke positive indirect effects on encouragement of adoption of 
new ideas and new technologies as they become available in the world. According to the 
research provided by Hall and Jones (1998), the highest measured levels of social 
infrastructure are in Switzerland, the United States, and Canada. All three countries have 
among the highest levels of per capita output in the world. On the other hand, the three closest 
to the lowest social infrastructure are in Zaire, Haiti, and Bangladesh. All three countries have 
among the lowest levels of output per capita in theworld. Furthermore, the research 
concludes that the countries most influenced by Europeans in the past have a social 
infrastructure conducive to high levels of per capit  output. 
In explanation of persistent poverty in developing ations, Romer (1993) takes two 
extreme views into consideration. These views are obj ct gap and idea gap. Object gap 
encompasses objects like factories, roads and raw mterials. Thus, countries are poor because 
they are lacking valuable objects. On the other hand, idea gap represents access to ideas that 
are used in industrial nations to generate economic value. Thus, countries are poor because 
the citizens of these countries do not have access to ideas. Furthermore, it is possible that a 
developing country suffers from both gaps at the same time. Both views support the view that 
a functioning legal system, a stable monetary policy, and effective support for education yield 
benefits and help reduce both gaps. However, the basic proposition of Romer is that idea gaps 
are central to the process of economic development. In the growth theory there is enough 
flexibility in construction of growth accounting residuals that it is possible to set the 
technology residual to zero. However, economic history provides knowledge of how 
production looked like some 100 years ago. Both these historic events and current events give 
 
support to a discovery; innovation and invention have great importance in economic growth. 
Furthermore, goods provided by these activities are fundamentally different from ordinary 
objects. “We could produce statistical evidence suggesting that all growth came from capital 
accumulation, with no room for anything called technological change. But we would not 
believe it” (Romer, 1993). Another assumption of universal availability of knowledge to 
everybody is misleading. For example, Taiwan had no industrial base to become the fourth 
largest producer of synthetic fibres in 1981. The importance here lies in specific joint ventures 
and licensing agreements with firms from Japan and the US. Another example is India, a 
country with a large quantity of highly skilled human capital, where there were strict 
constraints on the activities of foreign firms (at least by the beginning of the 1990s when India 
started to open up). India failed to develop industrie  comparable to Taiwan. With these 
examples in mind, “the assumption that all technological knowledge is broadcast like short 
wave radio transmission to every country in the world seems as inappropriate as the 
assumption that there has been no technological change” (Ibid.). In terms of influence of 
inflation on growth it can be argued that inflation has much effect on growth. However, if the 
idea flow from foreigners is sensitive to macroeconomic stability, and these idea flows are 
important for growth, than the effects of macroeconomic instability are easier to incorporate. 
Conclusion 
 
From the historical viewpoint, we can observe a major importance of technology for growth 
and development and present levels of development. However, if the technology is the major 
issue, this should mean that all countries should converge to higher levels of development. 
Naturally, this does not hold. The historical development of countries is not one and the same. 
Leaders in the past are not leaders today. Britain may have been the leader, and the first 
country to industrialize, but that was not enough to stay on top. This ever changing role of 
leaders and followers is a continuing historical occurrence. Furthermore, one should be 
patient with the diffusion and wider use and benefits of invention and innovations. It takes a 
long time for new technologies to take root, even in situations when new technologies are 
largely available, transferable and more productive han traditional technologies. Countries 
have shown a lot of rigidity to this respect, some have lost entire industries to other countries 
due to inflexibility. 
One of the components that are attributed to fast growth of both European countries and 
successful East Asian countries is social capability which was in place once technology was 
available for transfer. In such conditions technology plays a major role in growth and 
development. However, if such threshold is not present, technology or technology transfer is 
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 Ovaj rad se bavi razvojem tehnologije kroz povijest. Promatranje s povijesnog stajališta nam 
omogućuje promatranje dugotrajnih procesa razvoja tehnologije i njen utjecaj na ekonomski razvoj 
zemalja u vezi s vodećim pozicijama u tehnologiji, tehnološkim rascjepima i procesima približavanja. 
Povijesno stajalište zauzeto u ovom radu započinje s Industrijskom revolucijom kao prijelomnicom i 
završava u današnjem vremenu. Taj je stav zauzet zbog revolucionarnih promjena u tom periodu u 
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